Resumen de Dialectical Monadology and Innumerable Species: The Concept of Species in Nishida Kitarō’s Later Philosophy
Nishida Kitarō is often criticized for erasing the singularity of individuals by introducing the concept of “species” in his later philosophy. However, Nishida instead criticizes Leibniz’s monadology that obliterates the singularity of the individual. In contrast, by making the monadology dialectical, Nishida thematizes the relationship between the world and individuals that contains the gap, and attempts to ensure the singularity of individuals.
Nishida also criticizes the absence of “species” in Leibniz. This reveals that for Nishida, the concept of species does not obliterate the singularity of the individual but rather enables it. However, this concept has one limitation. The limitation lies in Nishida’s belief that the individual has a single species as its root. This creates a mirror-image relationship between species and individuals. However, this concept also has potential. Nishida often emphasizes the “innumerability” of the species. This study focuses on its innumerability and clarifies that the concept of “innumerable species” in Nishida’s philosophy guarantees the singularity of the individual.
