The independence of economic authorities and supervisors: the case of the Banco de España: testimony by the Governor of the Banco de España before the Audit Committee on Democratic Quality, Congress of Deputies, 22 December 2020

• Hernández de Cos, Pablo ^[1]
  1. [1] Banco de España
• Localización: Documentos ocasionales - Banco de España, ISSN 1696-2222, Nº. 5, 2021, págs. 1-43
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
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• Resumen

  • In his testimony, the Governor’s analysis of the impartiality and autonomy of independent economic authorities contributes to the Committee’s review of the “measures needed to strengthen the impartiality and independence of independent authorities and regulatory agencies”. He first reviews the arguments warranting the independence of economic authorities and supervisors. He then goes on to address the features that conform an institution’s formal independence, detailing their specific form in the case of the Banco de España. Next, he reflects on the status of independence as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the proper performance by independent agencies of their functions. He then highlights possible measures for strengthening the independence of the Banco de España, and identifies potential improvements to the financial supervision model in Spain. Lastly, he refers to the Bank’s control mechanisms and transparency standards, and certain aspects of its governance.