Resumen de Evaluations are inherently comparative, but are compared to what?
Minah H. Jung, Clayton R. Critcher, Leif D. Nelson
Understanding how objective quantities are translated into subjective evaluations has long been of interest to social scientists, medical professionals, and policymakers with an interest in how people process and act on quantitative information. The theory of decision by sampling proposes a comparative procedure: Values seem larger or smaller based on how they rank in a comparison set, the decision sample. But what values are included in this decision sample? We identify and test four mechanistic accounts, each suggesting that how previously encountered attribute values are processed determines whether they linger in the sample to guide the subjective interpretation, and thus the influence, of newly encountered values. Testing our ideas through studies of loss aversion, delay discounting, and vaccine hesitancy, we find strongest support for one account: Quantities need to be subjectively evaluated—rather than merely encountered—for them to enter the decision sample, alter the subjective interpretation of other values, and then guide decision making. Discussion focuses on how the present findings inform understanding of the nature of the decision sample and identify new research directions for the longstanding question of how comparison standards influence decision making. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved)
