By analysing the Anglo-Italian imperial competition in the Arabian Peninsula, this article will show that, behind the façade of European partnership, a seditious cover war was being waged in that part of the world. Although this belligerency never erupted into an actual armed conflict between the two powers, what is striking is the underlying incompatibility of interests and long-term goals. British decision-makers and military planners persistently sought to preserve the security of their Empire and to maintain their network of sea communications and levels of trade and commerce. The fulfilment of this desire demanded the maintenance of the status quo and opposition to attempts to control the sensitive waterways through which British troops and materials were obliged to pass. There can be little doubt that Benito Mussolini’s supreme goal was expansion, either by peaceful or warlike means. The realisation of this aim presupposed the domination of both the Mediterranean and the Red Sea and the establishment of spheres of influence in the Arabian Peninsula. The fact that Anglo-Italian relations remained relatively undamaged up to 1935 was only due to the diplomatic, economic,military and political realities on the 1920s.
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