Essays in applied-microeconomics and development /
- Autores: Alejandra Catalina Ramos Moreno
- Directores de la Tesis: Giacomo De Giorgi (dir. tes.), Nezih Guner (dir. tes.)
- Lectura: En la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona ( España ) en 2017
- Idioma: español
- Tribunal Calificador de la Tesis: Maria Kaufmann (presid.), Mónica Martínez Bravo (secret.), Alessandra Voena (voc.)
- Materias:
- Enlaces
- Resumen
In my doctoral thesis I use applied-microeconomics as a tool for policy re-design in developing countries. With it, I deep in the understanding of why policies work, and how we can use economic incentives to attain better outcomes.
In Chapter 1, "Household Decision Making with Violence: Implications for Transfer Programs", I study how intimate partner violence responds to transfers to women, and whether this response depends on the transfer being in-kind or in-cash. To this end, I develop a model of household decision making in which the husband can use violence to solve spousal disagreement, but violence destroys female labor productivity. Under this framework, the utility gains the husband can appropriate through violence are lower when the transfers are in-kind than when the transfers are in-cash. As a result, in-kind and cash transfers can have different effects. I estimate this model using data from a randomized controlled trial in Ecuador, providing transfers to women of poor families either in-kind or in-cash. The results indicate that, if the beneficiaries of the program receive a cash transfer equivalent to 10% of the average household income, the prevalence of violence would reduce from 17% to 10%. If the same transfer were given in-kind, violence would decline by 3 additional percentage points. These differential effect of in-kind transfers over cash transfer amplifies as the size of the transfer increases.
In Chapter 2, "Does Rewarding Pedagogical Excellence Keep Teachers in the Classroom? Evidence from a Voluntary Award Program" (joint work with Samuel Berlinski), we analyze the effects on teacher retention and between school mobility of a program that rewards excellence in pedagogical practice in Chile. Asignación a la Excelencia Pedagógica or AEP is a voluntary certification program designed to reward excellence in teaching practice. Teachers whom succeed on a set of assessments receive a 6% annual wage increase for up to 10 years. We use a sharp regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effect of receiving the award. Using administrative data over several cohorts of applicants, our estimates indicate that, locally, the award does not alter transitions out of the school system. We interpret this finding with a simple model of teachers' quit behavior. Teachers that marginally fail to receive the award value their jobs more than their outside option. We observe, however, an increase in mobility within the school system among teachers that receive the award. Some of these mobility patterns are consistent with the award providing a signal of teacher ability.
In Chapter 3, "The Effects of Public Recognition of Teaching Excellence on Peers Voluntary Certification" (joint work with Samuel Berlinski), we continue the study of AEP and analyze peers effects in teachers decision to apply for voluntary certification. In addition to the wage increase, AEP certified teachers are invited to become mentors of other teachers, and their names are announced in a ceremony with local authorities and media coverage. We identify the effect of being certified on peers' future application for the program using a sharp regression discontinuity design. Our findings suggests that being publicly certified as an excellence teacher doubles peers' application for the program without lowering the quality of the applicants.
