Recent studies in accounting have investigated the role of qualitative information in the relation between managers and investors. In my thesis, I mainly focus on two sources of qualitative information represented by financial reporting and media respectively. The focus on these two sets of information allows me to identify either the sentiment or the arguments used by managers for informing investors. Furthermore, it permits to distinguish information as either value relevant or biased for assessing a reduction or amplification of asymmetry between managers and investors. In the second chapter, I analyze the optimism used by managers for describing market risk factors as function of their ability in managing companies. The findings suggest that only in the presence of monitoring high-ability managers implement less impression management towards investors. In the third chapter, I investigate investors’ reaction to financial reporting information in a setting with the exclusive presence of sophisticated investors. The results demonstrate how sensitive market players are to information they find less credible and misaligned with quantitative data. In the fourth chapter, I focus on financial reporting information as function of topics released in the media. There is a curvilinear association (inverted u-shaped) between those arguments treated by media and investors’ uncertainty. Furthermore, companies are associated with higher market uncertainty for not treating topics included in the media.
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