Strategic network formation and behavior on networks
- Autores: Rahmi Ilkilic
- Directores de la Tesis: Antoni Calvó-Armengol (dir. tes.)
- Lectura: En la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona ( España ) en 2007
- Idioma: español
- Tribunal Calificador de la Tesis: Jordi Massó (presid.), Sjaak Hurkens (secret.), Guillaume Haeringer (voc.), Olivier Bochet (voc.), Ebru Giritligil Ayca (voc.)
- Materias:
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- Resumen
The world is not diminishing in size, but the growing number of connections between economic units and the ease of communication makes it look smaller. It is no surprise that most of the current challenges face involve networks. Most environmental resources (i.e. fresh water, clean air, fisheries) are interconnected, independent of the country borders. Oil and natural gas pipelines are playing an ever increasing economic and political role. Two of the most interesting questions are how the economic agents decide to link with others and how they behave on a given network. A correct analysis of strategic network formation and behavior on networks should be based on the well established theory of non-cooperative games. But the combinatorial structure of networks introduces new technical and computational challenges. This made the research on networks rely on make shift or ad hoc tools, which mostly required some form of tacit communication between agents. This study makes a standard non-cooperative analysis of network formation and behavior on networks, without referring to any implicit or explicit cooperation between agents. The results presented uncover stability and efficiency considerations which escaped the attention of earlier researchers.
