Resumen de Product fraud in supply chains: the case of deceptive counterfeit
In this thesis, we study the impact of deceptive counterfeit goods on trustworthy, legitimate supply chains. With the aim of eradicating counterfeit activity, supply chain members can take a variety of preventative measures, namely (i) ensuring the availability of a trusted primary source, (ii) adopting a track-and-trace technology which can detect counterfeit prior to sales and (iii) sharing information about counterfeit severity once discovered.
Firstly, we study the intermediary’s optimal procurement policy over a finite horizon when a trusted primary source is randomly available in the future and no trackand- trace technology is in effect. With the aim of higher service quality, intermediaries might turn to alternative suppliers carrying potentially counterfeit goods. We therefore prove the optimality of state-dependent order-up-to level replenishment policies under different liability schemes for an intermediary with access to two sources of supply: (i) one genuine supplier subject to random disruptions, and (ii) an alternative supplier offering the same goods, but of dubious quality.
Secondly, we compare the optimal procurement policy (i) prior to and (ii) after the implementation of a track-and-trace system. In this chapter, the manufacturer, instead of being available or unavailable, faces a capacity restriction. We find that, whether or not the technology is adopted, the intermediary buys from the alternative supplier despite running the risk of receiving counterfeit goods. In scenarios where no track-and-trace system is in place, the intermediary is less willing to procure from the alternative source than from the primary source. However, this relationship is reversed when track-and-trace systems are in place.
With the aim of putting a stop to counterfeit, many manufacturers have collaborated with enforcement agencies in gathering information on counterfeit adulteration.
Thirdly, we analyze a manufacturer’s willingness to share their findings with downstream members, in the attempt to increase an intermediary’s effort. In this chapter, the manufacturer can (i) truthfully disclose counterfeit adulteration to the intermediary privately, (ii) truthfully disclose to the intermediary and the consumers publicly or (iii) stay silent. In response to this information provision (or lack thereof), the intermediary chooses the level of effort necessary to protect his service. We find that the manufacturer optimally discloses his private knowledge solely to the intermediary, and this only when counterfeit incidences can result in notable safety risks to consumers.
The consumers receive information only through the intermediary, provided that he is not obliged to professional discretion. In such a scenaro, the consumers will only be notified if the potential harm is not too severe.
