This research aims to advance coherent philosophical arguments to defend the justice of such extra-judicial operations that have animated the work of the Truth and Justice Commissions, especially those concerning the decision to give moral importance to truth-telling, the care of the victim and the reconciliation strategy by providing additional non-material forms of compensation.
Caring about responsibility, especially collective responsibility means to keep in mind a particular ethical movement that takes into account the sympathetic figure of the Other as the starting point of morality. This is why, from a theoretical point of view, the moral-philosophical heritage watches over the criticism of the individualism and liberalism: in particular, In part I, I will refer to Sartre’ analysis on Autrui and intersubjectivity, his account of the role of emotion in moral judgment. That is a common aspect of Jaspers’ work. I will discuss with neo-Aristotelian tradition and virtue ethics, considering also authors such as Cooper and Tollefsen defending the idea of collective responsibility. Finally, I intend to focus on May’s work and his Sartre’s intersubjectivity interpretation.
In part II, after establishing the suitability of collective moral responsibility, I concentrate on the fact that this can consistently explain our intuitions about justice on material and immaterial compensations as tools for national reconciliation. In addition, I found interesting to outline how practices demanded by transitional justice responds to the need for “difficult forgiveness” imagined by Ricoeur. In my thesis, this would be recognized as “political judgment-in-situation”.
In part III, I justify the pardon and apology starting from some peculiar interpretations of international law and from a normative posture that calls for a critical interpretation of transitional justice as a hopefully critical approach to global justice.
© 2001-2024 Fundación Dialnet · Todos los derechos reservados