Philosophical Studies

• 

  Año 2016, Vol. 173, Número 4

  • Introduction: : perceptual evidence

    James Genone

    págs. 873-874

    

  • Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence

    Susanna Schellenberg

    • Resumen

    págs. 875-896

    

  • Schellenberg on the epistemic force of experience

    Matthew McGrath

    • Resumen

    págs. 897-905

    

  • Perceptual evidence and the capacity view

    Ram Neta

    • Resumen

    págs. 907-914

    

  • What is my evidence that here is a cup?

    Adam Pautz

    • Resumen

    págs. 915-927

    

  • Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence defended: : replies to McGrath, Pautz, and Neta

    Susanna Schellenberg

    • Resumen

    págs. 929-946

    

  • The epistemic significance of experience

    Alex Byrne

    • Resumen

    págs. 947-967

    

  • Perceptual knowledge and relevant alternatives

    J. Adam Carter, Duncan Pritchard

    • Resumen

    págs. 969-990

    

  • Perceptual reasons

    Juan Comesana, Matthew McGrath

    • Resumen

    págs. 991-1006

    

  • Intentionalism, defeasibility, and justification

    Kathrin Glüer

    • Resumen

    págs. 1007-1030

    

  • Serious theories and skeptical theories: : Why you are probably not a brain in a vat

    Michael Huemer

    • Resumen

    págs. 1031-1052

    

  • Experiential evidence?

    Jack C. Lyons

    • Resumen

    págs. 1053-1079

    

  • Asymmetry arguments

    Berislav Marušić

    • Resumen

    págs. 1081-1102

    

  • Basic factive perceptual reasons

    Ian Schnee

    • Resumen

    págs. 1103-1118

    

  • Perception and the external world

    Declan Smithies

    • Resumen

    págs. 1119-1145