Basic factive perceptual reasons

• Autores: Ian Schnee
• Localización: Philosophical Studies, ISSN-e 1573-0883, Vol. 173, Nº. 4, 2016, págs. 1103-1118
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Many epistemologists have recently defended views on which all evidence is true or perceptual reasons are facts (including McDowell, Pritchard, Williamson, and Littlejohn). On such views a common account of basic perceptual reasons is that the fact that one sees that p is one’s reason for believing that p (McDowell, Pritchard, Millar, Haddock). I argue that that account is wrong; rather, in the basic case the fact that p itself is one’s reason for believing that p. I show that my proposal is better motivated, solves a fundamental objection that the received view faces, and illuminates the nature of reasons for belief.