Philosophical Studies

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  Año 2016, Vol. 173, Número 7

  • Beliefs, buses and lotteries: : Why rational belief can’t be stably high credence

    Julia Staffel

    • Resumen

    págs. 1721-1734

    

  • Probabilistic promotion revisited

    Jeff Behrends, Joshua DiPaolo

    • Resumen

    págs. 1735-1754

    

  • Objective truth in matters of taste

    Mihnea D. I. Capraru

    • Resumen

    págs. 1755-1777

    

  • Meditation and self-control

    Noa Latham

    • Resumen

    págs. 1779-1798

    

  • Do evolutionary debunking arguments rest on a mistake about evolutionary explanations?

    Andreas L. Mogensen

    • Resumen

    págs. 1799-1817

    

  • The grounding problem for eternalism

    Thorben Petersen

    • Resumen

    págs. 1819-1852

    

  • Embodied mind sparsism

    S. Clint Dowland

    • Resumen

    págs. 1853-1872

    

  • If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ

    Jonathan Way, Daniel Whiting

    • Resumen

    págs. 1873-1895

    

  • Naïve realism and phenomenological directness: reply to Millar

    Erhan Demircioglu

    • Resumen

    págs. 1897-1910

    

  • The pen, the dress, and the coat: : a confusion in goodness

    Miles Tucker

    • Resumen

    págs. 1911-1922

    

  • Dynamic permissivism

    Abelard Podgorski

    • Resumen

    págs. 1923-1939

    

  • What can we not do at will and why

    Hagit Benbaji

    • Resumen

    págs. 1941-1961

    

  • In defence of the four-case argument

    Benjamin Matheson

    • Resumen

    págs. 1963-1982

    

  • A liberal realist answer to debunking skeptics: : the empirical case for realism

    Michael Huemer

    • Resumen

    págs. 1983-2010