The grounding problem for eternalism

• Autores: Thorben Petersen
• Localización: Philosophical Studies, ISSN-e 1573-0883, Vol. 173, Nº. 7, 2016, págs. 1819-1852
• Idioma: alemán
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• Resumen

  • In this paper, I develop an argument against eternalism, which is similar to the widely discussed grounding problem for presentism. It has recently been argued by many that presentism should be rejected on grounds that its sparse ontology is not suited to underwrite the healthy dose of realism we all share about the past. My aim basically is to add a new twist to the debate, by showing that actually eternalists are no better off than their rivals. In particular, I argue that the eternalist’s ontology does not have the appropriate shape to ground true propositions about the past.