“Believing at will is possible”−or is it? Some remarks on Peels’s “truth depends on belief” cases and voluntariness
Claudio Cormick, Valeria Carolina Edelsztein
págs. 1-39
Korsgaard's Expanded Regress Argument
Samuel J. M. Kahn
págs. 40-65
The status of arguments in abstract argumentation frameworks. A tableaux method
Gustavo Adrián Bodanza, Enrique Hernández Manfredini
págs. 66-108
On the alleged error of formal objections to normative error theory
Jeremiah Joven Joaquin
págs. 109-121
Quasi-truth and defective knowledge in science: a critical examination
Jonas R. Becker Arenhart, Décio Krause
págs. 122-155
Between thinking and acting Fichte’s deduction of the concept of right
Laurenz Ramsauer
págs. 156-197
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