Peer Evaluations and Team Performance: When Friends Do Worse Than Strangers

• Autores: Brice Corgnet
• Localización: Working Papers ( Universidad de Navarra. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales ), Nº. 12, 2009
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • We use peer assessments as a tool to allocate joint profits in a real effort team experiment. We find that using this incentive mechanism reduces team performance. More specifically, we show that teams composed of fellows rather than strangers actually underperform in a context of peer evaluations. We conjecture that peer evaluations undermine the inherently high level of intrinsic motivation that characterizes teams composed of friends. We finally analyze the determinants of peer assessments and stress the crucial importance of equality concerns.