'Theory of mind' in animals: : ways to make progress

• Autores: Elske van der Vaart, Charlotte K. Hemelrijk
• Localización: Synthese, ISSN-e 1573-0964, Vol. 191, Nº. 3, 2014, págs. 335-354
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Whether any non-human animal can attribute mental states to others remains the subject of extensive debate. This despite the fact that several species have behaved as if they have a 'theory of mind' in various behavioral tasks. In this paper, we review the reasons of skeptics for their doubts: That existing experimental setups cannot distinguish between 'mind readers' and 'behavior readers', that results that seem to indicate 'theory of mind' may come from studies that are insufficiently controlled, and that our own intuitive biases may lead us to interpret behavior more 'cognitively' than is necessary. The merits of each claim and suggested solution are weighed. The conclusion is that while it is true that existing setups cannot conclusively demonstrate 'theory of mind' in non-human animals, focusing on this fact is unlikely to be productive. Instead, the more interesting question is how sophisticated their social reasoning can be, whether it is about 'unobservable inner experiences' or not. Therefore, it is important to address concerns about the setup and interpretation of specific experiments. To alleviate the impact of intuitive biases, various strategies have been proposed in the literature. These include a deeper understanding of associative learning, a better knowledge of the limited ...