Normative scorekeeping

• Autores: Robin Mckenna
• Localización: Synthese, ISSN-e 1573-0964, Vol. 191, Nº. 3, 2014, págs. 607-625
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Epistemic contextualists think that the truth-conditions of 'knowledge' ascriptions depend in part on the context in which they are uttered. But what features of context play a role in determining truth-conditions? The idea that the making salient of error possibilities is a central part of the story has often been attributed to contextualists, and a number of contextualists seem to endorse it (see Cohen (Philos Perspect, 13:57-89, 1999 ) and Hawthorne, (Knowledge and lotteries, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004 )). In this paper I argue that the focus on salience relations is a mistake. On the view I defend, the relevant features of context are facts about what error-possibilities and alternatives those in the context have a reason to consider, not facts about what error-possibilities and alternatives those in the context actually consider. As I will argue, this view has certain advantages over the standard view.