Stochastic games of resource extraction

• Anna Jaśkiewicz ^[1] ; Andrzej S. Nowak ^[2]
  1. [1] Wrocław University of Technology

     Wrocław University of Technology

     Breslavia, Polonia

     
  2. [2] University of Zielona Góra

     University of Zielona Góra

     Zielona Góra, Polonia

     
• Localización: Automatica: A journal of IFAC the International Federation of Automatic Control, ISSN 0005-1098, Vol. 54, 2015, págs. 310-316
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • We study stochastic games of resource extraction in which the transition probability is a convex combination of stochastic kernels with coefficients depending on the joint investments of the players. Our approach covers the unbounded utility case which was not examined in this class of games beforehand. We give two theorems on the existence of pure stationary Markov perfect equilibria for the models of games under consideration. A detailed discussion with illustrative examples explains the meaning of our assumptions and their relation to the conditions used earlier in the literature.