Judging beyond any reasonable doubt: A logic and epistemological rule

• Autores: Rocco Neri
• Localización: Quaestio facti. Revista internacional sobre razonamiento probatorio, ISSN-e 2604-6202, Nº. 7, 2024, págs. 43-68
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • The doubt is not related to innocence but only to guilt, the latter being the exclusive object of the process. The proof of guilt, being always of inductive nature, cannot accept the deductive method that connotes the relationship between premise (minor and major) and conclusion. From here arises the necessity that beyond reasonable doubt must respond to the postulates of logic and the motivation of judgments is an example. Research tends to show whether there is a valid theory to overcome the doubt of uncertainty about guilt-innocence. Can jurisprudence (mathematics-legal) as an exact science aid in the discovery of a perfect syllogism for a valid theory of reasonable doubt?