Understanding epistemic injustice as contributory injustice: A comment on Picinali’s argument

• Autores: Tareeq Jalloh
• Localización: Quaestio facti. Revista internacional sobre razonamiento probatorio, ISSN-e 2604-6202, Nº. 7, 2024, págs. 187-199
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This paper offers some further support to Federico Picinali’s argument, in «Evidential Reasoning, Testimonial Injustice and the Fairness of the Criminal Trial», that a trial is unfair when assessments of relevance and probative value includes an epistemic injustice, namely a testimonial injustice. It has been argued that there are barriers to establishing testimonial injustice in specific cases, such as the ones Picinali surveys. This paper argues that even if we accept that there are concerns about establishing the occurrence of a testimonial injustice in the cases Picinali identifies, we can reformulate the epistemic injustice that renders the trial unfair as a contributory injustice. Reformulating the epistemic injustice as a contributory injustice evades the concerns we might have with establishing testimonial injustice, allowing Picinali’s broad argument that a trial is unfair when an assessment of evidence includes an epistemic injustice—contributory, or testimonial—to remain intact. This reformulation also offers new propositions on how to combat epistemic injustice.